ABSTRACT With the development of information technology, various data-driven intelligent services have changed our daily life greatly. As the data fuels the development of these services, data sharing is desirable for data availability issues. Many mechanisms and technologies have been proposed to support data sharing. However, some organizations, especially with potential competitive relationships are still reluctant to share their data. On one hand, no data holder wish to see the competitiveness improvement of competitors by data sharing. On the other hand, data sharing suffers from huge privacy security risks. To encourage data sharing, in this paper, a competitiveness-driven and secure incentive mechanism is proposed. By introducing the concept of data competitiveness as incentive motivation, competitiveness worry of data holders is eliminated. Privacy is protected by adopting differential privacy. As the privacy protection levels of data holders are unknown to the data demander, a contract theoretic approach is proposed to formulate the incentive mechanism. With the design of optimal contracts, the data demander can make the best decisions to pay data holders and data holders can optimize their utilities by choosing proper contracts. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive scheme.
However, data holders might refuse to share their data to other organizations, especially with potential competitive relationships [1] , [5] . The reasons exist in two folds. Firstly, data holders are afraid that data sharing improves competitors' competitiveness, which can be called competitiveness worry. Through data sharing, competitors may improve the quality of their services based on the processing of acquired data. On the contrary, data holders' business is reduced due to the loss of data. This disadvantageous situation reduces data holders' passion of data sharing. For instance, data sharing and collaboration among medical sectors are critical to the research for new medicines, which can help save lives and improve wellbeing [6] . However, these sectors are often driven by profit and discovering the next super drug so that they refuse to share data [6] , [7] . Secondly, data sharing brings huge privacy security risks [4] . During data sharing, data is disclosed and individual's privacy is inevitably compromised [7] , [8] . As a result, the increasing privacy risks also impede the data sharing. Therefore, privacy protection is required. To protect privacy, data holders have to use privacy preserving techniques to build better data sharing models [9] . In this sense, to encourage data sharing for better data-driven intelligent services, incentive mechanisms are desirable for competitive organizations to eliminate the competitiveness worry and to protect privacy security.
To motivate data sharing in intelligent services, many incentive mechanisms have been proposed in the existing literature [10] [11] [12] . Auction theory, contract theory and game theory are popular tools to design incentive mechanisms.
Data buyers and sellers deal with data transactions through a way of bid in the auction theory based mechanisms. To improve the performance of participatory sensing services, which need a stable scale of participants, a reversed-auction based incentive mechanism is applied to encourage participants to carry on the sensing tasks [13] . In the proposed mechanism, participants send their expectations to the platform, and the platform chooses the users with lowest expectations as auction winners [14] . In mobile crowdsensing services, mobile users consume extra batter power and other related resources when they carry on sensing tasks. This needs incentive mechanisms to guarantee the data contributors recruitment [15] . A budget-limited reverse auction is proposed, where mobile users submit bids, and the service provider allocates the sensing tasks, and pays compensations to the winning users [15] . Double auction is applied to improve resource utilization of cloudlets. Buyers and sellers submit their bids and asks to an auctioneer. In the bilateral trade, the commodity is allocated to the buyer, whose bid is greater than the seller's ask [16] , [17] .
The contract theory based incentive mechanisms allow the data holders and demanders to exchange their data based on the prices in a contract. In [18] , a contract-based mechanism has been used to establish a crowdsourced wireless community network, where users with access points are encouraged to share their Internet access. To balance the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility for data mining, data owners and the data collector sign contracts to determine the data shared to the collector and compensation the collector pay to owners under the privacy protection [8] .
Game theory based models consider the dynamical interactions between data holders and demanders who have conflicts and commons. To collect massive sensitive data, a rewardbased collaboration mechanism is formulated as a Stackelberg game [19] . With a total reward of the master, users predict the strategies of others and make decisions to join the collaboration or not. To improve the energy efficiency of the ad hoc network, energy efficient topology control is carried out based on the state information sharing of wireless nodes, which is formulated as a coalition game [20] , [21] .
When data is used in data-driven services, it opens the door to various threats in privacy security. Therefore, privacy preserving is becoming a serious concern in the data sharing [9] . To protect privacy, many mechanisms, such as anonymization [22] , encryption [23] and differential privacy [24] , etc., have been proposed. To achieve secure private data transformation and publishing in a data mining framework, an encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the necessary data sets [9] . For the data in cloud storage, it suffer the threats in conventional insider and cloud-specific way. An encryption based methodology is proposed to protect the security of data sharing [25] . This method encrypts a file with an encryption key, which is stored by a trusted third party. In data mining, privacy is considered as a special type of goods [8] . The data owners' privacy is protected by anonymization methods in a data collector, who resides between data owners and data miners. A contract theoretic proposal is proposed to balance the trade-off between data utility and privacy protection [8] .
Although many mechanisms and technologies have been proposed to support data sharing, most existing mechanisms are applied by participants with cooperative relationships. How to encourage data sharing among competitive organizations is largely ignored. In data sharing among cooperative organizations, data holders and data demanders have cooperative relationships. For instance, in street view services, the services provider is the data demander, and users with smart devices are data holders. Users share real-time street view data to the demander and get rewards for their sharing. In this case, there are no competition between users and services providers. Users have more motivation to share data because they not only get reward from data sharing, but also enjoy better street view services [26] , [27] . Different from the current mechanisms, in this paper, we focus on incentives of the data sharing among competitive organizations.
Moreover, current privacy preserving methods lack the study of the privacy protection in data sharing among competitive organizations, which is still a problem to be addressed. For the privacy protection in data sharing, many current mechanisms are not credible. The reason is that the privacy protection is carried out in the third party rather than data sources. For example, to protect owners' privacy in data mining, anonymization techniques are employed at a 60068 VOLUME 7, 2019 data collector rather than data holders [8] . To provide secure data sharing in cloud storage, an encryption methodology is used to encrypt a file and the encryption key is stored by a trusted third party [25] . As the privacy is not protected in data sources, there are privacy disclosure risks even if these third parties are considered as trustful. To protect privacy, a privacy mechanism should be conducted at data holders.
To encourage data sharing among competitive organizations, it is desirable to eliminate competitiveness worry and guarantee the privacy security. Therefore, both competitiveness motivation and privacy protection should be considered in this paper. The concept of data competitiveness is introduced as a driving force for data transactions and differential privacy is employed in data holders for privacy preservation. As the privacy parameters is set by data holders privately, they are unknown to data demanders. We propose a contract theoretic approach to address the information asymmetry problem. With the design of optimal contracts, the data demander can make best decisions to pay data holders and data holders can optimize their utilities by choosing proper contracts. Numerical results demonstrate the performance improvement by the proposed scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is shown in Section II. The model is formulated based on contract theory in Section III. The optimal contract design is discussed in Section IV. In Section V, discrete optimal contract is analyzed for practical applications. Simulation results are discussed in Section VI. Finally, this study is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, to motivate data sharing among competitive organizations, data competitiveness is introduced to achieve a win-win result and differential privacy is adopted for the privacy protection in data holders.
A. DATA COMPETITIVENESS MODEL
In data sharing among organizations with competitive relationships, data holders are afraid that data sharing improves competitors' competitiveness through technical progress and even leapfrogging. Data holders' business is reduced due to the loss of data. This disadvantageous situation reduces data holders' passion of data sharing. However, if data holders obtain not only rewards such as money or reputation, but also the technical progress and competitiveness, they may recover the motivation of data sharing. For data holders and data demanders, there may be win-win results [28] . Therefore, data competitiveness is introduced as an important motivating factor, as defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Data Competitiveness): Data competitiveness is the ability or the technical progress to improve the quality of intelligent services, which has following characteristics:
• A competitive factor γ is the measurement of the data competitiveness of a data set.
• A data set with a higher competitive factor means more profit for a data holder. In this paper, data competitiveness is used as a transaction driving force for data holders to motivate data sharing. Based on the data competitiveness model, data holders share their data to the data demander, and obtain data competitiveness as rewards from the data demander. Thus, data holders eliminate the competitiveness worry by obtaining data competitiveness, which leads to win-win results for both data holders and the demander. For example, medical research sectors can advance the efficient treatment research for a certain illness case by processing the experimental data. Suppose sector A wants to accelerate the research and improve the probability of success. It may obtain sector B's experimental data through data sharing. In return, sector B can obtain the technical progress of sector A such as the efficient treatment, which is the data competitiveness of the shared experimental data. Therefore, both companies obtain benefits from the data competitiveness based data sharing.
B. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
To protect the privacy of data holders in data sharing, differential privacy is applied at data holders. Differential privacy is a strong and rigorous standard for privacy protection. It provides a way to maximize the accuracy of data queries while minimizing the opportunity to identify records when querying from statistical databases [24] . Some well-known software systems such as Chrome [29] and iOS [30] have applied differential privacy to protect users' privacy.
Suppose that D and D are neighboring databases, which are differing on at most one record. For D and D , a privacy mechanism M provides ε-differential privacy if it satisfies
where P M is the any output of M and S M ⊆ P M . The privacy parameter ε means the privacy protection level. The higher ε is, the lower privacy protection a data holder has.
Mechanism M provides privacy protection by randomizing the output and guarantees the probability of the same output unchanged when the dataset changes one record. For example, Table 1 shows whether a person has cancer, where 1 means yes and 0 means no. The dataset provides query services such as counting without releasing details. A query function f (i) = count(i) can get the number of persons with cancer in the first i line. Whether Alice has cancer or not can be calculated by count(5)−count (4) . However, function f can provide ε-differential privacy such as f (i) = count(i)+noise. Suppose the output of f (5) is one item in {2, 2.5, 3}. f (4) can output any item in {2, 2.5, 3} with the almost same probability. Thus, the attacker cannot obtain the result he wants by conducting count(5)−count (4) . Therefore, the privacy of the dataset is protected by ε-differential privacy.
In this paper, exponential mechanism is used to realize differential privacy. r is the output of a privacy mechanism M . M satisfies ε−differential privacy if it outputs r with probability propor-
Definition 2 (Exponential Mechanism [31]): Suppose there is a scoring function q(D, r). D is the dataset and
In this definition, q is the sensitivity of q. The sensitivity of a function is the maximum amount the output of the function can differ by when considering two neighboring datasets [32] , [33] . As differential privacy can provide a secure data sharing mode, data holders take ε-differential privacy before sharing their data to the data demander. In the medical experimental data sharing example, to avoid the privacy disclosure, sector B adopts differential privacy before sharing experimental data.
C. SYSTEM MODEL
A data sharing network is shown in Fig. 1 . There are N data holders and one data demander. They have competitive relationships. To improve the performance of intelligent datadriven services, the data demander would like collect data from data holders and benefit from data processing. If data holders hand over their data, they may lose the control of data and suffer potential privacy risks. Moreover the sharing of data may potentially improve the data demander's competitiveness. As data competitiveness is introduced to encourage data sharing, when a data holder decides to share data, it will receive data competitiveness as compensation. For the protection of privacy security, data holders apply differential privacy before data sharing. We use privacy parameter ε ∈ [ε, ε] to describe the privacy protection level. As the differential privacy is conducted in data holders, the privacy parameter is unknown to the data demander. As shown in Fig. 1 , data holder n takes differential privacy with privacy parameter ε n to protect privacy security, and then shares data q n to the data demander and expect to obtain data competitiveness expressed by γ n for the loss of q n .
To illustrate the system model clearly, we provide a simple example. Suppose hospital A has a dataset of current epidemics with their statistical numbers, such as {flu, measles, asthma, hepatitis}, in one day in a community. Now, one epidemic needs to be selected to prevent primarily and the decision satisfies ε-differential privacy. The statistical number is used as the scoring function and q = 1. According to the exponential mechanism, given the privacy parameter ε, the output probability of each epidemic is shown in Table 2 . From the table, we can see that when the privacy parameter ε of hospital A is large, there is a risk of privacy disclosure. Otherwise, the small privacy parameter brings high privacy protection but reduces the data utility. For the prevention of epidemics, another hospital such hospital B wants hospital A to share the data. Before sharing data to hospital B, hospital A takes differential privacy with a proper privacy parameter ε. With the data from hospital A, hospital B will know the trend of epidemics and improve the response to the outbreaks. Then, hospital B will give hospital A data competitiveness as compensation, such as how to prevent and treat the certain epidemic. Therefore, data sharing with proper differential parameter can achieve a win-win result for both hospitals. Otherwise, if hospital A does not join in the data sharing, it will not obtain any competitiveness and hospital B may ignore the epidemics, which results in the outbreaks.
III. CONTRACT-THEORETIC FORMULATION A. UTILITY FORMULATION
In the data sharing model, the data demander collects data from data holders. For an amount of data q, let G(q) denote the gain from data q, and we assume
, which means data gain function is strictly increasing and concave. Furthermore, without loss of generality, G(q) is expressed as
where ω is a positive factor indicating the weight of the data. Before sharing data, data holders adopt differential privacy. For the data holder with the privacy parameter ε, a larger ε means lower privacy protection. Compared to the data after lower ε differential privacy, the same data with larger ε differential privacy discloses more details and provides more value to the data demander, which means the utility of data is proportional to the privacy parameter. To illustrate this intuition, we define d(ε, q) to denote the utility of data q after ε−differential privacy, which is expressed as
where α is a positive factor. Although the utility of data improves the gain of the data demander, the marginal value of data decreases. Using (1), the gain of data q collected from the data holder with ε-differential privacy is
After receiving the data q from the data holder with ε-differential privacy, the data demander should pay data competitiveness as compensation to the data holder according to the system model. Therefore, the utility of the data demander can be expressed as
When data holder shares data to the data demander, it will suffer potential privacy loss issue. However, according to the data model, the data holder will be compensated by data competitiveness for the loss of data. Before sharing data q to the data demander, a data holder adopts ε−differential privacy to protect privacy. Therefore, the payoff of a data holder with ε-differential privacy can be defined as
where c is a cost parameter and εq represents the expected value of data loss with ε.
According to the system model, both the data demander and data holders want to maximize their own utilities. In this sense, the data demander should carefully decide how much data competitiveness should be paid to data holders with privacy parameter ε. However, when interacting with data holders, the data demander does not know the exact privacy parameters of data holders because data holders apply the differential privacy privately. Therefore, from the perspective of the data demander, the privacy parameter ε is a random variable. In this paper, we assume that the privacy parameter ε ∈ [ε, ε] is drawn independently and identically. The probability density function f (ε) and cumulative distributed function F(ε) are known to the data demander. Thus, there exists an information asymmetry between data holders and the data demander, which challenges the data sharing between participants.
B. CONTRACT-THEORETIC FORMULATION
To resolve the conflicting objectives of the information asymmetry problem, we propose a contract-theoretic approach. By designing optimal contracts, the demander not only encourages data holders to share data but also maximizes its own utility. Following the contract theory terminology [34] , the mechanism can be described as follows. Firstly, the data demander publishes a menu of contracts {(γ , q)} to data holders. A contract (γ , q) details the quantity of sharing data from the data holder and the corresponding data competitiveness. Secondly, when each data holder receives the menu of contracts, it evaluates the contracts and chooses one contract that maximizes its utility. Finally, based on the signed contract, the data holder shares data q to the date demander, and in return, the data demander pays data competitiveness to the corresponding data holder. According to the revelation principle in contract theory [8] , it is sufficient to consider the class of contracts that ensures data holders to truthfully choose the contract designed for their privacy parameters. Therefore, the contract can be designed as a pair of functions {(γ (ε), q(ε))}, where the contract (γ (ε), q(ε)) is designated for data holder with ε-differential privacy. Therefore, based on the chosen contract (γ (ε), q(ε)), the payoff of a data holder with ε-differential privacy can be rewritten as
To ensure that data holders will accept the contracts designated for them rather than choosing other contracts or refusing any contract, the menu of contracts must be incentive feasible. If (γ (ε), q(ε)) is a feasible contract, it should satisfy both the incentive compatibility constraints and the individual rationality constraints.
Definition 3 (Incentive Compatibility (IC)):
A menu of contracts {(γ (ε), q(ε)), ε ∈ [ε, ε]} satisfies the incentive compatibility if the best response of the data holder with ε-differential privacy is to accept the contract (γ (ε), q(ε)) rather than other contracts, i.e.,
(7) Definition 4 (Individual Rationality (IR)): A menu of contracts {(γ (ε), q(ε)), ε ∈ [ε, ε]} satisfies the individual rationality constraints if every holder with ε-differential privacy has a non-negative utility after accepting the contract, i.e.,
In the contract theoretic model, since the data holders' privacy parameters are unknown to the data demander, the utility of the data demander with a menu of contracts is evaluated in expected terms. For the data demander, its objective is to find an optimal menu of contracts which satisfies IC and IR constraints and maximizes the expected utility. Therefore, the data demander's objective can be formulated as (7) and (8),
where the function U D (q(ε), γ (ε)) is defined as
. (10) Therefore, according to the proposed contract-based formulation, the data demander calculates the optimal contracts that satisfies IC and IR constraints and maximizes its utility, and then broadcasts contracts to data holders. Each data holder chooses the contract that maximizes its utility. Finally, each data holder supplies the data demander its data and obtains data competitiveness as compensation according to the accepted contract. To achieve a win-win result in the proposed contract-based mechanism, the key problem is designing the optimal contracts.
IV. THE DESIGN OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
To design the optimal contracts, the optimization problem defined in (9) should be solved, which is a challenging work due to the complicated objective and constraints. In this section, we try to find equivalent conditions to the IC and IR constraints and simplify the optimization problem to a certain extent. Then, based on the simplification, the optimal control theory will be used to obtain the optimal contract.
A. SIMPLIFYING THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
To address the optimization problem defined in (9), we simplify the IC and IR constraints as much as possible.
Proposition 1: A menu of contracts {(γ (ε), q(ε)), ε ∈ [ε, ε]} satisfies the IC constraint if and only if
and
where q (ε) = dq(ε) dε and γ (ε) = dγ (ε) dε . Proof: According to (7), for any ε,ε ∈ [ε, ε], we have
Adding the two inequalities above, we have
As c > 0, the inequality means that q(ε) is a non-increasing function of ε. Therefore, it can be concluded that
i.e., q (ε) ≤ 0. Given the privacy parameter ε, (13) implies that the utility function of the data holder, u ε (γ (ε), q(ε)) = γ (ε) − cεq(ε) reaches its maximum atε = ε. Therefore, we have
i.e., γ (ε) − cεq (ε) = 0.
Next, we proved that conditions in (11) and (12) are also sufficient conditions for the IC constraint. According to (12), we have
According to (11), we then have
which follows the definition of IC constraint. 
Proposition 2: A menu of contracts {(γ (ε), q(ε)), ε ∈ [ε, ε]} satisfies the IC constraint. Then, the menu of contracts satisfies the IR constraint if and only if
Since c > 0 and q(ε) ≥ 0, we have −cq(ε) ≤ 0, which indicates that u ε (γ (ε), q(ε)) is a non-increasing function of ε. Therefore, ε minimizes u(ε), i.e.,
Thus, the IR constraint is equivalent to u ε (γ (ε), q(ε)) ≥ 0, i.e., γ (ε) − cεq(ε) ≥ 0. Theorem 1: For the optimal solution, the IR condition for ε is binding at the optimum, i.e., u * ε = 0.
(23) Proof: Suppose u * ε > 0, then the data demander could reduce u * ε by a small amount and keep q * (ε) unchanged. Thus, the data demander's payoff is increased, which conflicts with the optimality of u * ε . Based on the simplifications of IC and IR constraints, the optimization problem of the demander can be rewritten as (12) and (20) . (24) B. OPTIMAL CONTROL-BASED APPROACH
As the optimization problem for the data demander fits the general formulation of the optimal control problem, we use Pontryagin's maximum principle to solve (24) and to obtain the optimal data function q * (ε) [35] . Let q(ε) be the control variable, u ε (γ (ε), q(ε)) be the control variable and ε be the time variable. Let x(ε) = u ε (γ (ε), q(ε)). The Hamiltonian of the problem is expressed as
Based on the Pontryagin minimum principle [36] , the necessary conditions of the optimal control and states are as follows.
From the conditions above, we have
As having the λ * (ε), the optimal data function can be derived via taking the first-order derivative of Hamiltonian to q(ε). We get
Since (32) there exists q * (ε) that does maximize the Hamiltonian. From (31), we have the optimal q * (ε) as
Once having found the optimal data function q * (ε), we can determine the optimal utility function of data holders u * ε (γ (ε), q(ε)) and competitiveness function γ * (ε) according to (21) and (6) as
For example, we assume that data holders' privacy parameter is uniformly distributed within [ε, ε]. The probability density function is
Algorithm 1 Optimal Contract Implementation
Design Optimal Contract:
The data demander calculates the optimal contract {γ * (ε), q * (ε)} according to (33) and (35).
Publish Contract:
The data demander sends the contract {γ * (ε), q * (ε)} to all data holders.
Contract Selection:
After calculating its utility, each data holder decides whether to accept the contract or not.
Data Sharing:
Based on the accepted contracts, data holders supply data to the data demander and the data demander pays data competitiveness to holders.
The cumulative density function is
The optimal data function q * (ε) is calculated as
Combining (38), (34) and (35), we have the competitiveness function in the optimal contract as
and the optimal utility function as
The proposed contract-based mechanism can be implemented according to Algorithm 1. Once the data demander has the data requirement, it calculates the optimal contracts based on the sharing network information. Then, the data demander sends the contracts to all data holders. Once receiving the provided contracts, data holders choose the best contract to maximize their utilities or refuse the contract. Finally, the data sharing participants start trades in terms of data and data competitiveness according to the contract.
V. DISCRETE OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN
In the last section, we have provided simplified sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal contracts and presented the optimal data function and competitiveness function. Whereafter, we illustrated how to implement the optimal contract with an implementation algorithm. However, this scheme has one drawback that it needs the distributional knowledge of privacy parameter. In practice, it is hard to obtain the distribution of such a parameter, especially when the distribution is too complicated to evaluate. In this section, we change the privacy parameter to be discrete and try to realize a more practical contract design. As the number of contracts are finite, the problem is more practical.
We assume the set of privacy parameters = [ε, ε] is quantified with a factor K . In this sense, privacy parameters are reduced to a discrete set, i.e., = {δ 1 , δ 2 , · · · , δ K }. Without loss of generality, we assume that δ 1 < δ 2 < · · · < δ K . The quantization process is considered to be uniform with equidistant values, i.e., δ k = ε + (k − 1)σ where σ = ε − ε K . It is reasonable mainly because it is easy to implement and close to the representation of continuous distribution. However, in general a non-uniform quantization process can also be chosen in practice.
If K is large enough, the privacy parameters are almost equal to a δ k in . For data holder n with ε-differential privacy, denoted as ε n , if the difference between the ε n and δ k is not larger than σ 2 , it can be considered that data holder n' privacy parameter is δ k , i.e., ε n ≈ δ k . Therefore, π kn is used to determine whether the ε n is approximately equal to δ k , which is expressed as
According to the formulation in Section III, the objective of the data demander is to maximize its expected utility by designing an optimal contract (γ (δ k ), q(δ k )) (it is simplified as as (γ k , q k ), ∀δ k ∈ ). Since the optimal contract (γ k , q k ) should satisfy the IC and IR constraints, it follows the deduce in Section III. The IC constraint in discrete form is given by
The IR constraint in discrete form is given by
Therefore, the discrete form of the objective function in (9) can be expressed as
To solve the discrete optimization problem in (44), some simplifications are also necessary. Theorem 2: In the optimal solution, the IR constraint for the highest privacy parameter is binding, i.e., γ K − cδ K q K = 0.
Proof: For any δ k ∈ and δ k < δ K , according to IC constraint, we have
If IR for δ K is inactive, so is IR for δ k . Thus, all the other IRs except for δ K , can be ignored. If IR for δ K is not binding, suppose γ K − cδ K q K > 0, then all competitiveness γ k can be reduced by the same amount data, which does not affect IC and hence increases the utility of the data demander, which contradicts with the optimality of utility function. Therefore, the IR constraint for δ k is binding as
In the optimal solution, q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ · · · ≥ q K ≥ 0 and all the upward adjacent ICs are binding and others can be ignored, i.e.,
(46) Proof: Based on the IC constraint, for any δ k > δ j ,
Since δ k > δ j , we have q j ≥ q k . As qs are all assumed to be positive, we have
1) Proof of sufficiency:
Suppose the adjacent upward ICs are binding, then we can rewrite (46) as follows
Considering some j such that j > k, then using (50) and (51), we have
Then, considering some j such that j < k, then using (50) and (51), we have
Combining (52) and (53), we have the IC constraint expression
Hence all the ICs are automatically satisfied when adjacent upward ICs are binding.
2) Proof of necessity:
Suppose some upward adjacent ICs are not binding for optimal solutions. For example, taking one such type δ k for which adjacent upward IC is inactive, based on IR for δ k+1 , we have
If we reduce all γ j , ∀j < k with equal amount and the adjacent upward IC for δ k becomes active, it will have no effect on any IR and the existing relation between adjacent upward ICs for any other privacy parameter. We can iteratively repeat the process (starting with the highest privacy parameter for which adjacent upward IC is inactive) till all the adjacent upward ICs are binding. During the process, only reducing the data competitiveness can bind all the upward adjacent ICs. In turn, it automatically guarantees that all other ICs are satisfied. This therefore increases the data demander's utility. Hence, the original contract is not optimal because there is a better contract, which is a contradiction.
Based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, the optimization function in (44) can be expressed as
where
Taking the derivative of the function to q k and equating it to zero, the optimal data function can be obtained as
The optimal competitiveness function can be correspondingly obtained by combining (57) and (58).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we use numerical simulations to evaluate how the proposed incentive mechanism performs in data sharing. The simulation parameters are set as follows. We assume the privacy parameters are distributed within [0.01, 0.21] uniformly. Data weight ω is set to be 100. The processing complexity factor α = 2 and the cost parameter c = 1.
A. THEORETIC OPTIMAL CONTRACT INVESTIGATION
We firstly study the theoretic optimal contract in Algorithm 1, whose performance is shown in Fig. 2 . From the figure, we can see that the data function decreases with the increase of the privacy parameter. The reason is that, according to differential privacy, the larger the privacy parameter value, the greater the risk of privacy disclosure. In this sense, data holders lose interest to share data, which leads to the decrease of the data in optimal contract. The performance of competitiveness function in optimal contract and the utility of data holders under the variation of privacy parameter values are depicted in Fig. 3 . According to the optimal utility function and competitiveness function in (34) and (35), the utility and competitiveness of data holders are related to the data shared. More data shared brings data holders more competitiveness and more utility. However, when the privacy parameter becomes larger, due to the lack of privacy protection, data holders are reluctant to share data. Therefore, larger privacy parameter leads to the decrease of the data shared, and results in the reduce of competitiveness function and utility function as shown in Fig. 3 .
B. PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
Then, we study the utility performance of data demanders and data holders with the proposed incentive mechanism compared to that without data sharing. Without data sharing, VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Performance improvement of the data demander. the data demander and the data holder only process the data they already have. On the contrary, when the data demander and data holders join the data sharing activities, the data demander has more data to utilize and the data holder can benefit from the competitiveness from data sharing. Fig. 4 shows the performance improvement of the data holder. It is assumed that the data possessed by the data holder is 4000. Without data sharing, its utility is unchanged for any privacy parameter. When the proposed incentive mechanism is adopted, the utility performance is improved. As the privacy parameter increases, the effectiveness of data sharing decreases. The reason is that the high privacy parameter leads to the drop of the data shared and the reduce of data competitiveness and utility. The performance improvement of the data demander is depicted in Fig. 5 . We assume that data holder 1 and data holder 2 with privacy parameter 0.02 and 0.1 participate in data sharing. From the figure, as data owned by the data demander increases from 0 to 5000, the utility without data sharing increases. With the proposed mechanism, data demander performs much better in terms of utility. When collecting the data from the data holder with a higher privacy parameter, data demander obtains more utility. Compared to the data sharing with only one data holder, more data holders contributes more benefit to the data demander.
Therefore, with the proposed data sharing mechanism, data demanders and data holders significantly improve their utilities compared to those without data sharing.
C. DISCRETE OPTIMAL CONTRACT INVESTIGATION
Finally, we study the discrete optimal contract performance compared to the theoretic results. The performance of the discrete optimal data function and competitiveness function is depicted in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , respectively. As shown in the figures, the discrete optimal data function and competitiveness function are close to their theoretic results. As K increases, both functions are getting closer to their theoretic results. It is noticed that the two curves almost coincide when K = 50, which that the data function and discrete competitiveness function in discrete optimal contract design are a good approximation to the theoretic results with a large K . Therefore, the optimal contract design in discrete form is approaching the theoretic results well and can be used in the practical data sharing.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyze challenges in data sharing among organizations with potential competitive relationships. To address the competitiveness worry problem, data competitiveness is introduced as a motivation factor. Differential privacy is employed in data holders to deal with the privacy security problem. By jointly considering the data competitiveness and differential privacy, an incentive mechanism is proposed to maximize the utilities of competitive participants in data sharing. As there exists an information asymmetry in privacy protection levels, the incentive mechanism is formulated as a contract theoretic approach. With the design of optimal contracts, the data demander can make best decisions to pay data holders and data holders can optimize their utilities by choosing proper contracts. Numerical results demonstrate the good performance of the proposed scheme. XIANGWEI ZHENG is currently a Professor with the School of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, China. He has authored more than 30 national and international publications in conferences and journals. His current research interests include cloud computing, computer networks, and computational intelligence. He has been involved with the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
